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Abstract
Social media have been central in informing people about the COVID-19 pandemic. They influence 
the ways in which information is perceived, communicated and shared online, especially with 
physical distancing measures in place. While these technologies have given people the opportunity 
to contribute to public discussions about COVID-19, the narratives disseminated on social media 
have also been characterised by uncertainty, disagreement, false and misleading advice. Global 
technology companies have responded to these concerns by introducing new content moderation 
policies based on the concept of harm to tackle the spread of misinformation and disinformation 
online. In this essay, we examine some of the key challenges in implementing these policies in 
real time and at scale, calling for more transparent and nuanced content moderation strategies to 
increase public trust and the quality of information about the pandemic consumed online.
Keywords
content moderation, COVID-19, disinformation, misinformation, social media, trust
Content moderation is used in a variety of contexts as a ‘governance mechanism’ to structure com-
munity participation to facilitate cooperation and civility (Grimmelmann, 2015). On social media, 
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content moderation is typically an automated process based on machine learning and computer 
algorithms characterised by limited human interaction. Historically, social media companies have 
resisted intervening in public discourse, perceiving of themselves as impartial conduits for conver-
sations rather than curators of content. In recent years, these companies have been criticised for not 
taking their influence on public discourse seriously enough with regard to issues around violence, 
discrimination and political interference as exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 
which political groups were exposed for misusing the data of millions of Facebook users. The 
global spread of misinformation about COVID-19 on social media has led to an ‘infodemic’, as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) termed it, with platforms under pressure to respond to false and 
misleading information about the virus.
In an effort to increase public trust and avoid government oversight, technology companies 
have worked together with governments and healthcare agencies to elevate authoritative sources 
related to COVID-19 and to jointly combat fraud and misinformation about the virus. Most of 
these policies centre around the concept of harm. Twitter, for example, has broadened its definition 
of harm to address ‘content that goes directly against guidance from authoritative sources of global 
and local public health information’ (Gadde and Derella, 2020). Facebook and Instagram announced 
that they would ‘remove COVID-19 related misinformation that could contribute to imminent 
physical harm’ (Clegg, 2020), and YouTube (2020) created a ‘COVID-19 Medical Misinformation 
Policy’ that prohibits misinformation about COVID-19 that ‘poses a serious risk of egregious 
harm’ and contradicts medical information provided by the WHO or local health authorities.
While technology companies – Facebook, Reddit, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, 
YouTube – have taken a coordinated approach to content moderation by directing users to reliable 
information from government healthcare agencies when they log into the service or search for 
related content, their approaches to combatting misinformation related to COVID-19 differ in sig-
nificant ways. For example, while the controversial film, Plandemic (2020), which documents 
numerous false and misleading claims about COVID-19, was removed from Facebook and 
YouTube for spreading misinformation and inciting harm, shorter excerpts of the film were permit-
ted on these sites. Twitter also allowed the film’s protagonist, Dr Judy Mikovits, to maintain her 
account, which she uses to promote dubious health claims to her followers. Despite these compa-
nies’ shared intention to mitigate harm, the varied outcomes of their harm policies point to the 
difficulties of operationalising the concept of harm into automated content moderation strategies at 
scale. In what follows, we elaborate on the key challenges of reducing content moderation strate-
gies to the concept of harm in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Scientific understandings of harm are uncertain and evolving
Given the novelty of COVID-19, much remains unknown about the virus and a considerable 
amount of what is thought to be known could turn out upon closer inspection to be inaccurate, 
incomplete or based on an obsolete knowledge of the virus. Take, for example, the WHO’s (2020a) 
suggestion on 14 January 2020 that ‘Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-
to-human transmission’ of COVID-19, which turned out to be false. Likewise, the WHO’s initial 
guidance against the use of face masks countered much scientific advice, until the WHO updated 
their official guidance on the use of masks to protect against and limit the spread of COVID-19 on 
5 June ‘based on new scientific findings as the epidemic evolves’ (WHO, 2020b). Issues around 
accuracy are confounded not only by emerging data – the notion of scientific facts as ‘moving 
targets’ (Scheufele et al., 2020) – but the accessibility of pre-prints not yet subject to peer review 
and medical papers based on unreliable data rather than randomised controlled trials, both of which 
raise quality issues as exemplified by now retracted papers from The Lancet and New England 
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Journal of Medicine concerning the efficacy of the malaria drug, hydroxychloroquine, as a treat-
ment for COVID-19. The problem social media companies face is how to engineer harm from a 
theoretical concept to an algorithmic practice in real time and at scale to contend with issues of 
uncertainty, inaccuracy and emerging data.
Conceptions of harm are particularly tenuous when used to regulate information related to 
causes and treatments for the virus. What currently appears to be accurate information (e.g. 
COVID-19 originated in a wet market in Wuhan, China) may turn out to be false. Removing con-
flicting claims from social media sites based on current official advice could erode public trust in 
scientific and medical professionals. Moreover, there is ambiguity with regard to the efficacy of 
treatments and preventive strategies related to COVID-19 both among and within the scientific 
community (e.g. claims about ibuprofen’s role as a potential treatment). While some users have 
been criticised for promoting immune boosting diets and supplements on social media to protect 
themselves from COVID-19, scientific research provides compelling evidence for the role of vita-
min D to improve people’s immune system when they have a deficiency, making them less suscep-
tible to morbidity and mortality as a result of catching COVID-19 (Grant et al., 2020). Although 
vitamin D is not an established treatment for COVID-19, the language around health and disease 
prevention is nuanced and difficult to regulate at scale.
The concept of harm is not neutral
Social media platforms are never neutral and impartiality is impossible to implement (Gillespie, 
2018). This is especially the case regarding the concept of harm, where the decision to moderate 
content extends beyond legal requirements. When Twitter announced in March 2020 that it would 
broaden its definition of harm in light of COVID-19, the revised definition included more serious 
examples of misinformation (e.g. specific and unverified claims that incite people to action and 
cause widespread panic, social unrest or large-scale disorder) to the denial of global or local health 
authority recommendations (e.g. denying the efficacy of social distancing measures), and the 
‘description of alleged cures for COVID-19, which are not immediately harmful but are known to 
be ineffective’ (Gadde and Derella, 2020). Tweets from the Presidents of Venezuela and Brazil 
were removed for violating this policy, with tweets by world leaders subject to greater levels of 
regulation than those posted by average users. At the same time, a potentially harmful tweet by US 
President Trump claiming that ‘HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE & AZITHROMYCIN, taken 
together, have a real chance to be one of the biggest game changers in the history of medicine’ was 
permitted on Twitter; despite correlating with a 2000% increase for the anti-malarial drugs hydrox-
ychloroquine and chloroquine in the United States between 15 to 21 March 2020 (Vaduganathan 
et al., 2020). While claims promoting false treatments for COVID-19, such as advocating drinking 
bleach or ingesting colloidal silver, are evidently harmful and more straightforward to regulate, in 
some circumstances official guidance from global and local health authorities designed to mitigate 
harm remain highly contested (e.g. school closures, lockdown and quarantine guidelines).
Policies based on harm are ideologically motivated and politically biased. By virtue of the way 
content moderation practices are enacted from the standpoint of the individual user, they necessar-
ily arbitrate between competing – and often incompatible – political interests and values. This 
occurs at the individual, national and international level. It is exemplified by varied user perspec-
tives on COVID-19; competing state and national Government interests in the case of the United 
States and the United Kingdom, where scientists petitioned against the UK Government’s delay in 
introducing lockdown measures, and differences between countries. For example, Sweden and 
New Zealand’s initial responses to COVID-19 were diametrically opposed, the former based on 
‘herd immunity’ and the latter based on an elimination approach; both of which used scientific 
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evidence to arrive at vastly different government policies. Despite some governments suggesting 
that their policies are ‘led by the science’, scientific views remain diverse and subject to competing 
interests and beliefs even within a single national context. Moreover, there are some questions that 
science cannot solely answer (e.g. whether to prioritise the economy or public health). The policy 
process is a highly contested space. Decisions about which lives to prioritise extend beyond utili-
tarian metrics, entering into the domain of ethics and moral philosophy. They are complex ques-
tions that transcend scientific understandings of safety and harm.
The concept of harm can be gamed to promote uncertainty, 
publicity and political values
Due to the volume of information about COVID-19 shared on social media, social media compa-
nies such as Twitter have relied increasingly on users (in addition to automated technologies and 
moderators) to alert them about misinformation and potentially harmful content. Content perceived 
to be harmful is then flagged, labelled, demoted or removed. At its most basic, these techniques 
indicate an objection. They are part of the process of content moderation, which is subject to com-
peting values and human interpretation. Despite being designed to mitigate harm, these practices 
can be gamed via algorithmic steering to produce mock outrage and publicity (Crawford and 
Gillespie, 2016: 420) or to promote uncertainty and doubt. This is particularly the case with disin-
formation campaigns, which seek to provoke discord and uncertainty in their targets rather than 
prove the veracity of a claim. Examples of disinformation commonly include memes, questions 
and personal anecdotes to sow the seeds of doubt (Baker and Rojek, 2019). During the height of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, strategies of this kind were evident with regard to the spread of 5G con-
spiracy theories with many high-profile users questioning the safety of these technologies (Baker, 
2020). Despite the harmful effects of disinformation, false and misleading claims are difficult to 
moderate when framed as questions and personal experience rather than medical advice.
Conclusion: moving beyond conceptions of harm
In light of the pandemic and associated ‘infodemic’, social media companies have implemented con-
tent moderation at an unprecedented speed and scale. The transmission of false and misleading infor-
mation, whether shared intentionally or not, can influence beliefs and result in ‘real-world harm’. 
Consequently, it is understandable that the collective response of social media companies in combat-
ting misinformation has been framed in terms of mitigating harm. However, as we have demonstrated 
throughout this essay, the concept of harm is neither implemented easily at speed nor scale. 
Engineering the concept of harm into algorithms and automated processes requires acknowledging 
that science is uncertain, evolving and must cope with the emergence of real-time data; that the con-
cept of harm is not neutral and will vary from the standpoint of individuals and collectives; and that 
content moderation can be gamed to promote certain values, generate publicity and foster doubt. 
Acknowledging these challenges points to the need to move beyond removing ‘harmful’ content on 
the basis that it violates ‘official’ advice to considering alternative strategies of labelling and tagging 
posts that appear to be false and retracting these statements if they turn out upon closer inspection to 
be valid. In practice, this would mean only removing content advocating harmful treatments and 
advertising breaches for fraudulent products where there is scientific consensus that these claims pose 
an imminent danger to consumers (e.g. products promoting ingesting colloidal silver as a treatment 
for COVID-19). Misinformation of this kind could be detected via key word searches and compiled 
in a register that would open these claims to public audit; distinct from Facebook and Twitter’s 
‘Transparency reports’, which only provide country statistics on removal requests without any insight 
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into which claims have been removed, by whom and why. Where health claims appear misleading, 
yet remain uncertain, labels could be used instead to highlight that such content counters the official 
public health advice of a particular government or health organisation while linking to that authorita-
tive advice. Applying these strategies would make a clear distinction between what is scientifically 
known to be harmful and claims that violate specific policy guidelines. By providing transparency 
and accounting for the complexities of implementing content moderation strategies efficiently and at 
scale, social media companies will not only provide more reliable content but increase public trust.
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